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Building on Prospect Theory, we apply the concept of loss aversion
to the formation of inﬂation perceptions and test empirically for non-
linearities in the inﬂation-perceptions relation for a panel of 10 Euro
area countries. Speciﬁcally, under the assumption of loss aversion, in-
ﬂation changes above a certain reference rate will be perceived more
strongly. Rejecting rationality of inﬂation perceptions in general under
symmetric loss and in a majority of cases under ﬂexible loss functions,
panel smooth transition models give evidence of non-linearities in the
inﬂation perception formation regarding both actual inﬂation and time.
This result is conﬁrmed by dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, where the
slope of the estimated value function is signiﬁcantly steeper in the loss
region and the implied average reference inﬂation rate is found close
to 2%.
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I1 Introduction
When assessing macroeconomic models empirically, economists mostly use
actual data as published by statistical institutes for the theoretical variables
in these models. However, there exists overwhelming empirical evidence that
peoples’ knowledge and perception of these variables may deviate consider-
ably from oﬃcial statistical data and their underlying concepts, questioning
the rationality of agents widely assumed since Muth (1961). Instead, inﬂa-
tion perceptions can be regarded as “nowcasts”, as agents form beliefs over
actual inﬂation on the basis of information currently available and poten-
tially subject to biases.1
The gap between actual data and individuals’ perceptions raises important
policy questions. This is especially true for inﬂation. As argued by van der
Klaauw et al. (2008), among others, if individuals have biased beliefs about
inﬂation, this can seriously undermine the central bank’s credibility. Con-
versely, a credible monetary regime can also inﬂuence inﬂation perceptions,
for instance by creating a focal point at the inﬂation target.2 Furthermore,
relating to the concept of money illusion3, the perception gap may lead to
distortions in bargaining if individuals misperceive their actual real purchas-
ing power. To assess the eﬀectiveness of policy propositions suggested by
macroeconomic models, it is thus necessary to understand how people form
perceptions about macroeconomic variables and how these perceptions in-
ﬂuence individual behavior.
So far, the literature on the formation of inﬂation perceptions has mainly
focused on one stylized fact, namely the observed jump in perceptions after
the Euro cash changeover in 2002, whereas actual inﬂation continued to stay
on a low level. Explanations for this jump range from price intransparencies
(Dziuda and Mastrobuoni, 2009), diﬃculties in applying the conversion rates
(Ehrmann, 2006), a perceptual crisis (Eife, 2006, Eife and Coombs, 2007, Ful-
lone et al., 2007 and Blinder and Krueger, 2004), macroeconomic illiteracy
(Del Giovane et al., 2008, Cestari et al., 2008), a media bias (Lamla and
Lein, 2008), and expectancy conﬁrmation (Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004).
A number of papers furthermore analyze factors inﬂuencing perceived inﬂa-
tion in general. Del Giovane et al. (2008) design a detailed survey for Italian
consumers in 2006. The authors report asymmetries in perceived inﬂation,
since respondents stating that they have observed price decreases over the
last ﬁve years report signiﬁcantly lower inﬂation perceptions than those not
1See Blanchﬂower and Kelly (2008), Blinder and Krueger (2004), Jonung and Laidler
(1988), Malgarini (2008), Curtin (2007) and van der Klaauw et al. (2008).
2Evidence for this channel has been found in inﬂation perception surveys for Sweden, see
Bryan and Palmqvist (2005).
3See Fisher (1928) for the original contribution, and Shaﬁr et al. (2004) and Fehr and Tyran
(2007) for a Behavioral Economics perspective.
1recalling any price decreases. Furthermore, survey responses suggest a strong
impact of socioeconomic factors on inﬂation perceptions. This is in line with
ﬁndings in Jonung (1981) who claims that inﬂation perceptions in Sweden
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between genders. Furthermore, in a recent survey, Jonung
and Conﬂitti (2008) report diﬀerences between age, gender, occupational and
regional groups with respect to opinions of the Euro currency, which may
also be reﬂected in inﬂation perceptions.
Lein and Maag (2011) analyze the formation of inﬂation perceptions for the
EU and Sweden, using data from the Joint Harmonized EU Program of Busi-
ness and Consumer Surveys and Sweden’s Consumer Tendency Survey. The
authors reject rationality of perceptions, since quantiﬁed inﬂation percep-
tions fail the rationality conditions of accuracy, unbiasedness and eﬃciency.
They also ﬁnd some evidence for the importance of frequently bought goods,
and for the expectancy conﬁrmation hypothesis in the Euro area after the
cash changeover. This is in line with Döhring and Mordonu (2007), who
report an inﬂuence of inﬂation expectations on perceptions in addition to
actual inﬂation, estimating a dynamic panel model for the countries that
adopted the Euro in 2002.
Following the deviation of perceived from actual inﬂation rates at the Euro
cash changeover, Brachinger (2006, 2008) proposes an Index of Perceived In-
ﬂation (IPI) meant to capture movements in perceived inﬂation better than
usual CPI inﬂation. The IPI index is constructed under the assumption
that agents perceive inﬂation according to behavioral patterns deﬁned in
Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kah-
neman (1981, 1991). These include the concepts of loss aversion with respect
to above-average inﬂation and the availability bias. Jungermann et al. (2007)
perform an experimental study of the assumptions underlying the IPI index,
and ﬁnd evidence of a loss aversion parameter of about 2.4 However, their
approach has been criticized by Hoﬀmann et al. (2006) for its use of arbitrary
ad hoc assumptions.
This paper adds to the literature as follows. Building on Prospect Theory by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1991), we
empirically test for the existence of loss aversion with respect to a reference
inﬂation rate aﬀecting the formation of inﬂation perceptions.5
Developed as an alternative decision theory under risk and uncertainty op-
posed to traditional expected utility theory,6 Prospect Theory proposes that
individuals code price changes and evaluate them against a reference price,
4This relates well to studies of loss aversion in other areas, where approximately the same
parameter has been found, see for example Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Hardie et al.
(1993) and Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008).
5Note that this is one of the hypotheses underlying the construction of the IPI index in
Brachinger (2006, 2008).
6See Starmer (2004) for an overview of developments in decision theory under risk.
2where higher prices are perceived as losses and lower prices are perceived as
gains. Since individuals display loss aversion, price increases are perceived
more strongly than price decreases, the exact quantity being captured by
the loss aversion parameter. Note that Prospect Theory deﬁnes loss aver-
sion with respect to prices, while we analyze loss aversion with respect to
inﬂation. This implies that a certain inﬂation rate is deemed ‘normal’, while
inﬂation rates above the ‘normal’ rate are perceived as a loss. Also, analyzing
loss aversion with respect to inﬂation entails a dynamic view of price devel-
opments, where reference prices and the reference inﬂation rate are grounded
in households’ historical experience (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).7
Figure 1 shows a stylized value function describing the relation between
perceived and actual inﬂation. The existence of loss aversion leads to a kink
at the reference rate of inﬂation, with a steeper slope in the loss region where
inﬂation rates are above the reference rate.8
< Figure 1 here >
We evaluate loss aversion regarding inﬂation by analyzing households’ sur-
vey data on perceived inﬂation compiled by the European Commission in
the Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys. In
order to apply for rationality tests, and to allow for the estimation of in-
terpretable slope parameters, the qualitative survey answers are quantiﬁed
with the method by Carlson and Parkin (1975), which has been adapted to
a pentachotomous survey by Batchelor and Orr (1988). The sample then
covers a panel of 10 Euro area countries from January 1996 to December
2010.
The empirical investigation takes the following route: First, we examine
rationality criteria for inﬂation perceptions following the seminal work of
Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) and test for the unbiasedness and eﬃciency
of perceived inﬂation. Underlying these rationality tests, however, is the
assumption of a symmetric loss function, which is no longer appropriate if
loss aversion with respect to high inﬂation rates is present. Thus, we extend
the analysis by applying the quantile approach by Patton and Timmermann
(2007), which accounts for both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions.9
Second, the existence and shape of a non-linear relation between perceived
7The concept of loss aversion has also been applied to other areas, such as brand choice or
consumption patterns, see for instance Hardie et al. (1993), Camerer (2000), Rosenblatt-
Wisch (2008), Foellmi et al. (2011) and Gaﬀeo et al. (2011).
8In order to determine the reference price, two routes can be followed. In the context
of consumer choice, the reference price is given by the fair price, which is determined
by consumers’ perceptions of sellers’ costs. This idea has ﬁrst been proposed by Thaler
(1985) and recently been pursued further by Rotemberg (2005, 2008). With regard to
inﬂation perceptions, Brachinger (2006) argues that one could simply take a past price as
the reference price. However, it is not clear whether one should use an average price of a
bundle of goods and how long the reference time period should be.
9A similar approach is followed by Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) who analyze asym-
3and actual inﬂation is investigated in a Panel Smooth Transition (PSTR)
setting proposed by Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005). This
approach allows the estimation of the reference inﬂation rate and the tran-
sition function, while accounting for potential structural breaks. Finally, we
estimate dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects models with threshold variables, deﬁning a
time-varying reference inﬂation rate, as a robustness check and in order to
determine the slope parameters and the location of the kink in a non-linear
perception-inﬂation relation.
Our analysis suggests the following results: While we generally reject ratio-
nality of inﬂation perceptions in our sample, allowing for asymmetric loss
functions yields a number of non-rejections in the second half of our sam-
ple period. This indicative result of asymmetries underlying the inﬂation-
perceptions nexus is further conﬁrmed by the PSTR models, which ﬁnd
non-linearities with respect to both actual inﬂation and time. Generally,
results suggest a signiﬁcantly stronger eﬀect of actual inﬂation changes on
perceptions once inﬂation is above a certain threshold, which is estimated
to be in the range from 1.8% to 3.3%. Estimates from dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects
models with a time-varying reference rate of inﬂation conﬁrm this result and
imply a reference rate close to 2%.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
data set, including the quantiﬁcation method for the qualitative survey data
and presents panel unit root and cointegration tests. Section 3 proceeds with
presenting the estimation design, followed by a discussion of the results in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data Set and Statistical Properties
2.1 Perceived and Actual Inﬂation
The hypothesis from Prospect Theory – there is a non-linear relationship
between perceptions and inﬂation – is tested empirically for a panel of 10
EMU-Countries consisting of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain for the time period from
January 1996 to December 2010. Our sample thus covers the Euro area
almost completely, and the sample period is long enough to enable us to test
for possible structural breaks.
We use a quantiﬁed version of the balance statistic of Question 5 of the
Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys by the
European Commission as our measure of perceived inﬂation. The oﬃcially
published balance statistic of the survey provides only a qualitative measure
from the pentachotomous survey, asking participants whether they think
metries regarding the formation of inﬂation expectations from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters in the US.
4prices have fallen/ stayed about the same/ increased at a slower rate/ in-
creased at the same rate/ increased more rapidly over the last 12 months.
Denoting the shares of answers in each category as s1, s2, s3, s4 and s5, the
balance statistic is obtained as s1 + 0.5s2 − 0.5s4 − s5. While most em-
pirical studies on perceived or expected inﬂation with data from the Joint
Harmonized EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys make use of
the balance statistic, there exist methods to quantify the qualitative data.
Given that we want to test the rationality of perceptions under symmetric
or asymmetric loss functions explicitly, we have to rely on quantiﬁed percep-
tion data. We thus follow Döpke et al. (2008) and employ a version of the
probability method proposed by Carlson and Parkin (1975) and modiﬁed by
Batchelor and Orr (1988).10
The quantiﬁcation method demands a scaling series that inﬂation percep-
tions are assumed to be based upon. We speciﬁcally assume that households
observe the underlying medium-term trend of the true inﬂation rate cor-
rectly and proxy the current scaling value of inﬂation with a recursively
estimated Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter under the usual assumption of λ = 14.400
for monthly data. Business cycle ﬂuctuations are therefore excluded from
the expected value observed by households. Details are explained in the
technical appendix of this paper (section A).11
Actual inﬂation rates are measured with annual inﬂation rates of harmonized
consumer price indices (HICP) from Eurostat. All data are available on a
monthly basis. Figure 2 shows the quantiﬁed perceptions together with the
inﬂation rates for all countries of our sample. In most countries of our
sample, on average quantiﬁed perceptions track actual inﬂation relatively
closely. Nevertheless, signiﬁcant deviations do occur, for instance at the
Euro cash changeover or at the spike in inﬂation before the ﬁnancial crisis.
< Figure 2 here >
2.2 Unit Roots and Cointegration
We test the time series of actual and perceived inﬂation rates for panel unit
roots in order to avoid spurious regressions. Details on the test statistics and
results are given in the appendix (section B). In line with results in the liter-
ature, e.g. Lein and Maag (2011), we ﬁnd that the null hypothesis of a unit
root in inﬂation is mostly rejected, while perceptions seem more persistent.
Generally, empirical evidence on the order of integration of inﬂation series is
mixed, Altissimo et al. (2006) conclude in a survey that empirical ﬁndings
10See also Nielsen (2003) for a survey.
11See Nardo (2003) for a critical overview on quantiﬁcation of survey data. Maag (2009)
analyses both quantitative and qualitative measures of Swedish inﬂation perceptions and
expectations. The author ﬁnds that quantiﬁed data and balance statistics are of equal
accuracy and that both are highly correlated with the mean of actual quantitative beliefs.
5seem to lean towards stationarity of inﬂation. Due to the mixed results with
respect to stationarity of perceived and actual inﬂation rates, we proceed to
test for panel cointegration between perceptions and inﬂation.
A detailed description of the panel cointegration tests applied and of the
results is again given in the appendix. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for coin-
tegration: For the whole sample period, all tests reject the null of no co-
integration at the 1% level. This, quite intuitive, result is in line with ﬁnd-
ings in Lein and Maag (2011) for a similar sample. Considering the results
from both panel unit root and cointegration tests, we estimate regressions
in the analysis in levels, making use of the super-consistency argument by
Engle and Granger (1987).
3 Estimation Design
3.1 Non-Rationality of Perceived Inﬂation under Flexible
Loss Functions
The paper of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) on the empirical investigation of
the rationality of professional forecasts initiated a bulk of literature on the
econometrics of rationality tests. These tests are regularly applied to inﬂa-
tion forecasts of professional forecasters and households. Under the assump-
tion that aggregate information dissipates slowly throughout the economy
(i.e. “sticky information”), households’ perceptions can be seen as forecasts
made today (so-called “nowcasts”), based on all the available information in
the current time period. Therefore, most rationality tests in the forecast
evaluation literature can be applied to inﬂation perceptions as well. How-
ever, rationality tests typically rely – implicitly or explicitly – on the axiom
of a symmetric loss function (see Granger, 1969; Bachelor and Peel, 1998;
Patton and Timmermann, 2007). The ﬁrst class of such tests dates back to
the seminal paper of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) and is therefore called
a “Mincer-Zarnowitz regression”. The test is constructed as a joint test of
the unbiasedness and eﬃciency of the forecast. Dufour (1981) and Campbell
and Ghysels (1995) suggest non-parametric tests on both aspects based on
a usual Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank-test (see Wilcoxon, 1945).12.
The symmetric loss function might be a good approximation for a wide range
of cases. However, asymmetric loss functions are also quite plausible and es-
pecially suitable in cases where a loss aversion model is to be tested. To test
for rationality in a broader sense, we therefore use a more ﬂexible approach
and employ an indicator function (or quantile approach) as proposed by Pat-
ton and Timmermann (2007). Under the joint assumption that the relevant
loss is a function solely of the forecast error and that the functional form of
12We report results of non-parametric rationality tests based on a symmetric loss function
in the appendix (section C)
6the loss function is homogenous in the forecast error, we can use an indicator
function which takes the value of one if the forecast is equal to or larger than
the realization (i.e. the perception is higher than the true inﬂation rate) and
estimate the following model:
It = α0 + α1 ˆ yt|t (1)
where ˆ yt|t is the perception in time t. Patton and Timmermann (2007) show
that the indicator variable It should be independent of any element in the
information set and therefore the restriction α0 = α1 = 0 should hold. We
report results from a probit model which is satisﬁed due to the binary nature
of the data.13
3.2 A Panel Smooth Transition Approach
Having tested for asymmetries in the inﬂation-perceptions relation in the
previous section, we proceed to investigate the (potentially nonlinear) rela-
tionship further by applying the Panel Smooth Transition (PSTR) model
developed by Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005). Recently, this ap-
proach has been used in a number of applications. With its help, Hurlin and
coauthors investigate the nonlinear relationship between public capital and
output (Colletaz and Hurlin, 2006), the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Fouquau
et al., 2008), and energy demand (Destais et al., 2009). Others have used the
PSTR-model to analyze nonlinearities with respect to health care expendi-
ture and GDP (Chakroun, 2010, Mehrara et al., 2010), the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
development and growth (Jude, 2010), and the link between inﬂation and
growth (Ibarra and Trupkin, 2011).
The increasing popularity of the PSTR-model might be due to the fact that
it has two advantages over simple ﬁxed eﬀects estimations.
First, the model allows to explicitly test for nonlinearity, and to endogenously
determine both the threshold and the degree of nonlinearity. Second, as will
become clear below, the PSTR-model also allows for diﬀerent coeﬃcients
of the explanatory variables over time and over cross-section units, whereas
the dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model only captures panel heterogeneity by ﬁxed
individual and time eﬀects. One caveat applies, however. By now, it is still
unclear how the PSTR-model, and also the PTR-model proposed by Hansen
(1999), behaves with respect to dynamic panels including lags of the endoge-
nous variable. Given the high serial correlation of inﬂation perceptions, this
problem deserves particular attention in our setting. Hence, we will present
PSTR estimates both including and excluding lagged inﬂation perceptions
from the nonlinear part, and also apply dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover,
13We experimented a bit with the functional form of the underlying cumulative distribution.
In most cases, logit models yield qualitatively similar results. Results are available from
the authors upon request.
7we estimate single country regressions using the Smooth Transition Autore-
gressive (STAR)-model developed by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) which
is able to deal with the existence of lagged endogenous variables.
Specifying and Estimating the Model
The PSTR-model, allowing for nonlinearities between the explanatory vari-
ables and the dependent variable, and a smooth transition between diﬀerent
regimes separated via a transition variable, is deﬁned as:
yit = µi + β0x′
it + β1x′
itG(qit;γ,c) + uit (2)
where t = 1,...,T and i = 1,...,N denote the time and the cross-section
dimension, respectively, and µi captures the ﬁxed individual eﬀects. For G,















Here, qit is the transition variable: in case we ﬁnd a nonlinear relationship,
the coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables change in line with the value
of the transition variable. c = (c1,...,cm)′ is an m-dimensional vector of
location parameters, i.e. the number of thresholds and regimes. For example,
if m = 1, we have one threshold, and two regimes, whereas for m = 2,
the model consists of three regimes, a middle one, and two identical outer
regimes. Finally, γ deﬁnes the steepness of the transition function, i.e., with
γ = 0 we are back to the linear model, and with γ → ∞, the model tends to
a regime-switching model as developed by Hansen (1999).
This model can be understood in two ways. First, it can be interpreted
as a regime-switching model, in which we get one coeﬃcient β0 in regime
one, and another coeﬃcient β0 + β1 if we are in regime two. Observations
are divided into regimes via the transition variable qit, and the transition
between regimes might be smooth or immediate, depending on the value of
γ. However, the model can also be seen as allowing for a large number of
small regimes, each one being determined by a speciﬁc value of the transition
variable. Applied to our research question: If individuals consider inﬂation
diﬀerently depending on whether it is above or below a certain threshold, we
will have a two-regime model, high- and low-inﬂation. By contrast, we could
also interpret the ﬁndings in such a way that individuals adjust smoothly
to changes in the inﬂation rate, resulting in various inﬂation/perception-
regimes.
The PSTR-model can also be extended to allow for more than one transition
function, in order to capture larger degrees of nonlinearity:












where r is the number of transition functions. If r = 0, we are back to the
linear model. Moreover, this latter speciﬁcation can be used to test for a
















with the time index t∗ = t/T as additional transition variable.
Summing up, this model allows for a number of possible relationships be-
tween the variables of interest. Applied to our research question regarding
the link between inﬂation perceptions and the actual inﬂation rate, we would
expect a model with m = 1 and r = 1, i.e. a model with one threshold (the
reference inﬂation rate), two regimes (one above and one below the reference
rate), and with one transition function. In case we ﬁnd a structural break,
we might get a model with r=2 and two diﬀerent transition variables, the
inﬂation rate and the time dimension.
Before estimating the model, we have to determine the number of location
parameters m, and the number of transition functions.15
We start by testing H0 : r = 0 vs. H1 : r = 1: If we do not reject the null
hypothesis, we conclude that the relationship is in fact linear, and estimate
a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model. If we reject the null, we continue with testing
H0 : r = 1 vs. H1 : r = 2, i.e., we test for remaining non-linearity. We
repeat this procedure until we cannot reject the null hypothesis anymore,
ending up with the optimal number of transition functions. The tests are
carried out by replacing G(qit;γ,c) in (2) by its ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion
around γ = 0. Hence, one estimates the auxiliary regression












where the vectors β∗
1,...,β∗
m are multiples of γ. Thus, testing H0 : β∗
1 =
... = β∗
m = 0 is equivalent to testing H0 : γ = 0 in (2), in which case the
model collapses into a standard linear ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression.
Next, estimation is carried out in three steps.16 First, the individual ef-
fects µi are removed by subtracting the individual-speciﬁc means. Then,
initial values for γj and cj are chosen by means of a grid search, and, given
14See Gonzalez et al. (2005).
15See for details Colletaz and Hurlin (2006).
16We use the RATS code developed by Gilbert Colletaz and Christophe
Hurlin that the authors have kindly made available online, see
http://www.univ-orleans.fr/deg/masters/ESA/GC/gcolletaz_R.htm.
9these values, the coeﬃcients βj are estimated with OLS. Third, using these
estimates, γj and cj are estimated by nonlinear least squares, allowing to
calculate the ﬁnal estimates for βj. After the estimations, information cri-
teria are compared in order to determine the optimal number of location
parameters.
Concerning the interpretation of the estimated parameters, we can calculate






















It is important to note that these derivatives cannot directly be interpreted
as elasticities, given that their value depends on G(qit;γ,c). More precisely,
if the transition function tends either to 0 or to 1, we can determine the
elasticities in the extreme regimes, β0 and β0 + β1. However, given that the
transition between regimes might be smooth, we receive a number of elastic-
ities deﬁned as a weighted average of the extreme values. This means that
the PSTR-model allows for diﬀerent coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables
for each country over time: In each period, and for each individual country,
the transition function takes on a diﬀerent value resulting in a speciﬁc value
for the elasticity.
Besides these time-varying and individual-speciﬁc coeﬃcients, we can inter-
pret the signs of the estimated parameters. If β1G is found to be positive,
this means that the estimated eﬀect from inﬂation on perceptions rises with
the inﬂation rate, i.e., the higher the level of the inﬂation rate, the stronger
the impact of a one percentage point increase on inﬂation perceptions.
Estimated Models
Using the inﬂation rate and time as transition variables, and the entire data
set 1996m01–2010m12, we ﬁrst test for nonlinearity with respect to both
transition variables. This takes into account the structural break between
inﬂation perceptions and inﬂation around the Euro cash changeover in Jan-
uary 2002, which has been documented by a number of researchers.
Hence, in case we ﬁnd nonlinearity, we estimate the following model:
π
p
i,t = µi + α0π
p
i,t−1 + β0πi,t + β1πi,tG(γ1,cm,1,πi,t)
+ β2πi,tT (γ2,cm,2,t∗) + εi,t (9)
10For the sake of comparison, we re-estimate the model using lagged inﬂation
perceptions also in the non-linear part.
π
p
i,t = µi + α0π
p













T (γ2,cm,2,t∗) + εi,t (10)
Depending on whether we ﬁnd one or two regimes (m = 1, or m = 2), the
transition functions become:
G(c1)/T(c1) = (1 + exp(−γ1(qit − c1)))
−1 (11)
G(c1,c2)/T(c1,c2) = (1 + exp(−γ1(qit − c1)   (qit − c2)))
−1 (12)
3.3 Dynamic Fixed Eﬀects
After testing for a non-linear relation between perceived and actual inﬂa-
tion in a general panel smooth transition setting, we estimate the change
in the slope of the value function, as well as the change in the intercept,
in a dynamic panel ﬁxed eﬀects model. Note that applying the well-known
dynamic panel estimator to our model also allows us to check for robustness
of the PSTR results, where so far applicability to models including a lagged
endogenous term has not been thoroughly investigated.
Assuming that the transition from the “gain” to the “loss” region takes the
form of a kink as in Figure 1, we construct two threshold-dummies that serve
to capture the periods where losses in the form of rising inﬂation occurred. If
the hypothesis of loss aversion holds, we should ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly stronger
impact of those “loss” periods on perceived inﬂation than of the “gain” periods
in inﬂation. The threshold-dummies for all i = 1,2,...,10 countries in the
panel are deﬁned as follows:
thold1,it =
 









it represents a 13-months backward-looking moving-average of in-
ﬂation and πHP
it stands for recursively HP-ﬁltered inﬂation. We thus assume
that the medium-term trend in inﬂation is observed correctly and serves
as the time-varying reference inﬂation rate. This is in line both with our
assumption for the quantiﬁcation procedure and with the theoretical argu-
ment that loss aversion regarding inﬂation implies a dynamic view on the
perception of prices and, thus, calls for a reference rate grounded in histori-
cal experience. The threshold dummies take on the value of one for periods
with above-average inﬂation, and zero otherwise.
11The threshold-dummies are then included in a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model
of inﬂation perceptions, both individually and combined with HICP inﬂation
rates. Thereby, we can account both for a change in the slope parameter
and for a change in the intercept during periods with above-average inﬂation






A signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient β2 in equation (13) suggests higher per-
ceived inﬂation rates in periods of above-average inﬂation for our panel and,
thus, gives evidence of loss aversion with respect to inﬂation. Regarding the
change in the intercept captured by α1, if we expect the reference rate of
inﬂation to be positive, the kink should lie above the origin and the intercept
for “loss” periods α1 would be below the normal intercept due to the steeper
slope of the value function in the loss region. In the presence of loss aversion,
we thus expect β2 to be signiﬁcantly positive and α1 signiﬁcantly negative.
Note that equation (13) models loss aversion with respect to inﬂation as a
long-run phenomenon, in line with the theory in Kahneman and Tversky
(1979).
4 Results
4.1 Rationality Tests under Flexible Loss Functions
Evaluating rationality of inﬂation perceptions under a wide range of loss
functions, we report results of the quantile test for rationality introduced by
Patton and Timmermann (2007).18 The results in Table 1 indicate that even
under the mild assumptions of the test used here, the null of rationality has
to be rejected in almost all cases if we test over the full sample period.
However, visual inspection as well as the results of formal structural break
tests reported later in the paper, lead us to conclude that at least one or
even two sample splits might be necessary to control for breaks. Interest-
ingly, the results change to some extent once we control for structural breaks
either around the Euro cash changeover or around the spike in inﬂation rates
shortly before the ﬁnancial crisis turmoil. Especially if we control for the cash
changeover break, the number of rejections drop signiﬁcantly. This is in con-
trast to the well-known results from traditional Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions
and other rationality tests based on the symmetric loss assumption, which
17We tested for possible endogeneity of inﬂation rates in equation (13), but found no corre-
lation between πit and εit in any of the speciﬁcations.
18Results of non-parametric rationality tests under the symmetric loss assumption as in
Campbell and Ghysels (1995) are given in the appendix of this paper in section C. Further
results of tests in the spirit of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) are available from the authors
upon request.
12uniformly reject the rationality of inﬂation perceptions (Jonung and Laidler,
1988; Lein and Maag, 2011; Dräger, 2011). We interpret this as a hint that
the result of “non-rationality” observed in other studies might to some extent
be driven by asymmtric loss functions, due for instance to loss aversion.
< Table 1 here >
4.2 Panel Smooth Transition Regression
Next, we turn to the results of the Panel Smooth Transition Model. Begin-
ning with the linearity tests shown in Table 2, we note that linearity with
respect to inﬂation is rejected if we allow for two thresholds (m=2), but
not for models with only one threshold. However, if we turn to test the
null hypothesis of one transition function (r=1) against the alternative of
at least two nonlinear functions, the null is also rejected for a model with
one threshold.19 This seemingly contradictory result might be due to the
structural break around the Euro cash changeover (see below), a fact that is
supported by the strong rejection of linearity with respect to time. Hence, we
continue to estimate models with one transition function for each transition
variable inflation and time.
< Table 2 here >
Next, we have to decide on the optimal number of thresholds, m. Table
3 displays the information criteria and the residual sum of squares (RSS)
for diﬀerent speciﬁcations. We use time as second transition variable, and
distinguish between models with one and two thresholds (1,1 and 2,2), in
addition to only one threshold for inﬂation and two thresholds for time (1,2).
The results are fairly clear-cut. Regarding the model with only inﬂation in
the nonlinear part, both the AIC and the Schwarz criterion prefer the model
with m = (1,2). By contrast, allowing for lagged inﬂation in the nonlinear
part, the information criteria choose m = (1,1) as the best speciﬁcation.
Hence, based on the test results, we continue to estimate (1,1)- and (1,2)-
models for both linear and nonlinear lagged perceptions.20
< Table 3 here >
The resulting parameter estimates are given in Table 4. As it turns out,
the results are fairly similar across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. With regard
19Restricting lagged perceptions to be linear does not allow to test for more than one tran-
sition function.
20As noted by Gonzalez et al. (2005), the test results have to be interpreted with cau-
tion, since the results are inﬂuenced by cross-country heteroscedasticity which cannot be
accounted for yet. Hence, we do not a priori refrain from estimating the (1,1)-model,
however, we are conﬁdent to exclude the (2,2)-speciﬁcation given that in this case, the
convergence of the algorithm is largely dependent on the starting values of the grid search.
13to time, we always ﬁnd large γT
′s pointing to the existence of at least one
structural break. The associated thresholds 0.4 and 0.8 roughly belong to
January 2002, the date of the Euro cash changeover, and to July 2008, the
beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis. Concerning the steepness of the transition
function using inﬂation as threshold variable, we get γG
′s between 0.8 and
2.2, however, the two lowest values estimated for the model using nonlinear
lagged perceptions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The associated
threshold inﬂation rates range from 1.8% to 3.3%. Next, we ﬁnd inﬂation
perceptions to be quite persistent with estimates of their lagged value close
to 0.9.
Regarding the eﬀect from actual inﬂation on perceptions, we thus do ﬁnd
support for loss aversion with respect to high inﬂation rates: All nonlinear
coeﬃcients πtG are signiﬁcantly positive, meaning that individuals perceive
changes in inﬂation more strongly if inﬂation is above a certain threshold.
Moreover, the coeﬃcient with respect to time πtT suggests that this eﬀect
either increased after the Euro cash changeover, or that the eﬀects have
been lower before the Euro cash changeover and after the beginning of the
ﬁnancial crisis.
< Table 4 here >
Note that these ﬁndings are also supported by the individual STAR regres-
sions that we have estimated as robustness checks for the time span 2002m1–
2010m12.21 The estimated thresholds lie between 2.5% and 3.5%, with the
exception of Spain where we estimate a threshold of 4%. Moreover, in case
of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, we ﬁnd
rather large γG
′s, and positive coeﬃcients for inﬂation in the nonlinear part.
Finally, we illustrate the diﬀerences in the eﬀects of actual inﬂation on per-
ceived inﬂation over time and between countries. For that purpose, Figure
3 shows scatter plots of actual inﬂation and the country- and time-speciﬁc
elasticities computed according to equation (8) for the PSTR-model allow-
ing only for the structural break at the Euro cash changeover.22 The black
line shows the relationship after the Euro cash changeover, and the gray line
the link for the period before. For all countries, we can observe a nonlinear,
smooth relationship between actual inﬂation and the elasticities. Besides, the
ﬁgures show an upward shift in the turning point of the transition function in
Austria, France, and Germany; a hint that in those countries, the reference
rate of inﬂation might have increased after the Euro cash changeover.
< Figure 3 here >
21The detailed results are available upon request. Prior to the Euro introduction, the results
are not reliable due to the short sample period.
22Allowing for the second structural break at the time of the ﬁnancial crisis yields qualita-
tively similar results.
144.3 Dynamic Fixed Eﬀects Estimations of Loss Aversion
Finally, we present results of the panel estimation of loss aversion as in
equation (13) with both threshold dummies in Table 5, where the ﬁrst column
additionally reports a test for adaptive perceptions.
< Table 5 here >
Due to our ﬁnding of cointegration between actual and perceived inﬂation,
we estimate all equations in levels, using dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects to account for
the high degree of persistence in perceived inﬂation. Even if this estimator
suﬀers from the Nickell (1981) bias, this is not a severe problem since T is
signiﬁcantly larger than N in our sample. For the same reason, the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator would be computationally ineﬃcient. Hence, we
employ the dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects estimator and check for a possible inﬂuence
from the Nickell bias by using the ‘Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected’
(LSDVC) estimator proposed by Bruno (2005).23 The results are robust
across all estimators. Additionally, conducting the Pesaran (2004) and the
Breusch and Pagan (1980) tests of error cross-section dependence reveals
that residuals are correlated across panels.24 Hence, we present estimates
with correlated panels corrected standard errors.
Estimation results from the PSTR model suggest the existence of two struc-
tural breaks in the perception-inﬂation relation over our sample period,
namely at the Euro cash changeover in January 2002 and at the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis in July 2008. Therefore, we conduct Quandt-Likelihood-
Ratio tests for single country estimations of the model in (13) with both
thresholds. The test runs individual structural break tests over each month
in the full sample period and selects the date with the maximum Wald F-
Statistic as the break date. Results presented in Table D.1 in the appendix
imply that, over the full sample period, the structural break during the
months preceding the ﬁnancial crisis dominates over the break at the Euro
introduction.25
We thus estimate the model in equation (13) over the full sample period
1996m1–2010m12 and compare the results to estimates from a restricted
sample period 1996m1–2007m12, excluding the dominant break.26
Throughout all models, we ﬁnd that lagged inﬂation perceptions yield a
highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of about 0.94–0.96. This suggests indeed a high
23Results are available from the authors upon request.
24Test results are available from the authors upon request.
25Restricting the sample period to 1996m1–2007m12, Quandt-Likelihood-Ratio tests identify
the second break at the Euro cash changeover in almost all sample countries. Results are
available from the author upon request.
26We further estimated models accounting for the break in January 2002 by including a
dummy variable taking on the value of 1 for the months 2001m11–2002m2. However, the
dummy was insigniﬁcant in all models and the coeﬃcients remained robust. Estimation
results are available upon request.
15degree of persistence in inﬂation perceptions; a results which was also im-
plied by the panel unit root tests above. We thus cannot rule out that
inﬂation perceptions in our panel are to some degree formed adaptively. In
the preliminary model without threshold dummies, the coeﬃcient on actual
inﬂation implies a long-run impact of 1.2 from actual to perceived inﬂation.
Accounting for a possible eﬀect of loss aversion on the perception-inﬂation
relation, both models for the full sample period yield a signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient β2, indicating that inﬂation indeed inﬂuenced perceptions signiﬁcantly
stronger in periods with above-average inﬂation rates. As expected, both
models also ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient α1 for the intercept dummy thold1,2.
However, only the model with thold2 constructed with recursively HP-ﬁltered
inﬂation yields a signiﬁcantly negative α1 and β1 signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Both the Akaike and the Bayes information criterion also prefer the second
model.
Comparing results over the full sample period to those from the restricted
sample 1996m1–2007m12, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients α1 and β2 remain
largely unchanged, while the coeﬃcient β1 measuring the overall impact
of inﬂation on perceptions is reduced from about 0.06 to about 0.05–0.04.
Simultaneously, inﬂation perceptions seem to be more persistent when disre-
garding the turbulent recent years. Overall, results suggest that loss aversion
with respect to inﬂation is a persistent long-run phenomenon, while the gen-
eral impact of actual on perceived inﬂation may be reduced in periods of
stable inﬂation rates.
< Figure 4 here >
In order to visualize the results given in Table 5, we simulate the value func-
tion regarding inﬂation implied by the long-run coeﬃcients of the dynamic
ﬁxed eﬀects model with thold2 over the full estimation period. The resulting
value function is depicted in Figure 4 for actual inﬂation rates ranging from
0% to 4%. The non-linear value function under loss aversion is marked by the
thick line, whereas the dashed lines indicate the non-applicable linear parts
in the gain and loss regions, respectively. In line with the stylized function
depicted in Figure 1, the slope of our estimated value function is signiﬁcantly
steeper in the loss region with inﬂation rates above the reference rate. The
average reference rate of inﬂation at the kink implied by the long-run coef-
ﬁcients of the model is found close to 2%, which is in line with our results
from the PSTR-models and which coincides with the implicit inﬂation target
by the ECB.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the concept of loss aversion from Prospect
Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981,
161991) can be meaningfully applied to provide explanations for individuals’
formation of inﬂation perceptions. Analyzing a panel of 10 Euro area coun-
tries for the sample period from January 1996 to December 2010, we ﬁnd
some evidence for asymmetries regarding the formation of inﬂation percep-
tions.
First, in line with other ﬁndings in the literature (e.g. Jonung and Laidler,
1988; Lein and Maag, 2011), we reject rationality of inﬂation perceptions
over the full sample period under the ﬂexible quantile approach by Patton
and Timmermann (2007), which allows for both symmetric and asymmetric
loss functions. However, once the possibility of a structural break at the
Euro cash changeover is accounted for, rationality can no longer be rejected
in a number of countries, while traditional rationality tests under symmetric
loss functions continue to reject rationality. This result might be driven by
the eﬀect of asymmetric loss functions, for instance due to loss aversion.
Second, we investigate the degree and type of non-linearity in the perception-
inﬂation nexus by estimating a panel smooth transition (PSTR) model pro-
posed in Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005). Estimating models
with two transition functions regarding actual inﬂation and time, the results
suggest reference inﬂation rates in the range from 1.8% to 3.3% and either
one or two structural breaks, one at the Euro cash changeover and one at the
beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis. Regardless of the speciﬁcation, all PSTR
models ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly stronger eﬀect of changes in actual inﬂation on
perceptions in the upper inﬂation regime, with an increase in coeﬃcients
between 0.4–0.6 once inﬂation is above the estimated reference rate.
Finally, since the applicability of PSTR models to dynamic panels includ-
ing a lagged endogenous variable has not been fully evaluated, results from
a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model with time-varying reference rates of inﬂation
are presented as a check for robustness. Both for the full sample period, and
for a shorter time span excluding the dominant structural break before the
ﬁnancial crisis, our results suggest that inﬂation rates above the threshold
are indeed perceived signiﬁcantly stronger. A simulated value function de-
scribing the perception-inﬂation nexus with the long-run coeﬃcients implied
by the model has a steeper slope in the loss region and an average reference
inﬂation rate at about 2%.
Overall, we thus ﬁnd some support of a non-linear relation between ac-
tual and perceived inﬂation rates in our EMU sample. While this leads to
the rejection of standard rationality tests, the concept of loss aversion from
Prospect Theory seems to describe the non-linear perception-inﬂation nexus
relatively well with an implied average reference rate close to the implicit
inﬂation target by the ECB.
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Table 1: Quantile Test for Rationality of Inﬂation Perceptions
1996m1–2010m12 1996m1–2001m12 2002m1–2010m12 1996m1–2007m12
Country z-stat Prob. z-stat Prob. z-stat Prob. z-stat Prob.
AT 3.973 *** -3.120 *** 0.24 3.662 ***
BE 3.027 *** 0.351 0.19 5.259 ***
ES 3.274 *** 2.099 ** 0.98 5.790 ***
FI -0.450 na na -2.28 ** 0.634
FR 3.153 *** -2.276 ** 0.24 3.884 ***
GER 2.978 *** 1.151 2.16 ** 2.951 ***
GR 3.976 *** 3.729 *** 4.54 *** 3.464 ***
IT 4.430 *** 3.001 *** 3.83 *** 3.517 ***
NL 7.401 *** -1.673 * 5.27 *** 7.238 ***
PT 4.798 *** 1.996 * 4.04 *** 6.822 ***
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.






No of thresholds m (1) (2) (1) (2)
transition variable: inﬂation
H0 : r = 0 vs. H1 : r = 1 0.082 7.729 2.044 13.224
(0.775) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000)
H0 : r = 1 vs. H1 : r = 2 - - 9.280 10.459
- - (0.000) (0.000)
H0 : r = 2 vs. H1 : r = 3 - - 0.121 0.002
- - (0.886) (1.000)
transition variable: time
H0 : r = 0 vs. H1 : r = 1 30.344 29.574 15.513 22.318
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: F-Statistic used for linearity tests. Numbers in parentheses denote p-values.
Sample period: 1996m1–2010m12.






No of thresholds m (1,1) (1,2) (2,2) (1,1) (1,2) (2,2)
No of param 8 9 10 10 11 12
RSS 59.971 57.678 57.948 59.241 55.961 55.926
AIC -3.387 -3.425* -3.419 -3.397* -3.453 -3.453
Schwarz -3.363 -3.397* -3.389 -3.367* -3.419 -3.416
Note: Test statistic used: F. Numbers in parentheses denote p-values. (i,j) deﬁnes the
number of thresholds for each transition function, e.g. (1,2) estimates one threshold
for inﬂation, and two thresholds for time. Optimal model highlighted by *.
Sample period: 1996m1–2010m12.








t (1,1) (1,2) (1,1) (1,2)
γG 2.272*** 1.900*** 0.820 1.262
(0.000) (0.000) (3.138) (2.292)
γT 3066.7*** 8143.0 2162.2*** 9585.1
(0.358) (65113.2) (181.7) (300019.7)
c1,G 2.668*** 3.307** 1.821 3.313*
(0.737) (1.278) (10.951) (1.828)
c1,T 0.402*** 0.402*** 0.403*** 0.403***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.017)




t−1 0.916*** 0.909*** 0.827*** 0.935***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.008)
π
p




t−1T - - 0.048*** -0.066***
(0.011) (0.009)
πt 0.032*** 0.092*** 0.037** 0.034**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011)
πtG 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.038** 0.060***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.015)
πtT 0.036*** -0.051*** 0.000 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Sample period: 1996m1–2010m12.




t (1) (2) (3) (2) (3)
π
p
t−1 0.935*** 0.938*** 0.940*** 0.957*** 0.964***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
thold1,2 - -0.035 -0.067*** -0.032 -0.061***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
πt 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.048*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
πt thold1 - 0.021* - 0.020* -
(0.011) (0.012)
πt thold2 - - 0.035*** - 0.039***
(0.012) (0.012)
constant -0.051** -0.039* -0.037 -0.041 -0.038
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028)
R2 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.988 0.988
AIC -889.848 -894.265 -905.318 -1088.192 -1103.791
BIC -878.868 -872.306 -883.358 -1067.130 -1082.730
CADF test residuals -5.686 -5.710 -5.664 -5.108 -5.064
prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
28Figures
Figure 1: Prospect Theory and Inﬂation Perceptions
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Question 5 of the EC Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and Con-
sumer Surveys asks if consumer prices over the past 12 months did:
1. Fall,
2. Stay about the same,
3. Increase at a slower rate,
4. Increase at the same rate,
5. Increase more rapidly.
In an inﬂuential paper, Batchelor and Orr (1988) derive how to transform
responses from a pentachotomous survey into a measure of inﬂation expec-
tations/ inﬂation perceptions. The method is based on and extends the
seminal work of Carlson and Parkin (1975).
We follow Nielsen (2003) – see Figure 5 below – in the description of the
method and use her terminology. The main assumption underlying such a






around 0 with δL
t ,δU
t > 0
such that participants in the survey report “no change” in prices (i.e. zero in-
ﬂation). Furthermore, there exists another interval
 
˜ µt − εL




the subjective expected value of the inﬂation rate ˜ µt such that individuals
report that “prices increase at the same rate”.
The respective questions of the survey here can be translated into such a
concept in the following way (xt+1 measures the time series of interest –
here: “inﬂation perceptions” which households have to form expectations
about):27
1. “Fall slightly” if xt+1 ≤ −δL
t .
2. “Stay about the same” if −δL
t < xt+1 ≤ δU
t ,
3. “Increase at a slower rate” if δU
t < xt+1 ≤ ˜ µt − εL
t ,
4. “Increase at the same rate” if ˜ µt − εL
t < xt+1 < ˜ µt + εU
t ,
5. “Increase more rapidly” if ˜ µt + εU
t ≤ xt+1.
27Note that we deal with perceptions as a latent variable which has to be “forecasted” based
on the information set in t. This is in line with models of sticky information as well as
models of rational inattention where updating of information is costly.
33We label the fractions of answers in the ordering of the questions from
A to E, respectively, that is: tµt+1 = ˜ µt × f (tAt+1,..., tEt+1), where
tAt+1,..., tEt+1 are the fractions of respondents answering each option, f is
a known distribution function (see Batchelor and Orr, 1988, p. 322, formula
(11)) and ˜ µt is the expected value of the perceived inﬂation rate that has to
be speciﬁed.
We use a version of the procedure proposed in Döpke et al. (2008) in order
to determine f and ˜ µt: We assume a normal distribution for f and fur-
thermore base ˜ µt on the medium-term trend of inﬂation, which households
are assumed to observe correctly. This is approximated by the HP ﬁlter,
which is calculated in a recursive way following a quasi-real-time approach.
For each period, t, we apply the ﬁlter with the usual penalty parameter
(λHP = 14400) for monthly data. Finally, we set ˜ µt equal to the value of
the HP ﬁltered inﬂation as of time t.














L µ t+ε t
U ~ ~ ~
Source: Nielsen, 2003, p.5
34B Unit Root Tests and Cointegration
Both inﬂation perceptions and actual inﬂation rates in our panel are tested
for unit roots over the whole sample period from January 1996 to December
2010. We apply ﬁve diﬀerent panel unit root tests: The Levin et al. (2002)
test assumes a common unit root process over all series in the sample. It
estimates proxies for ∆yit and yit−1 and tests for the null hypothesis H0 :
α = 1 in the regression ∆y∗
it = αy∗
it−1 + ηit, allowing for individual-speciﬁc
deterministic intercepts. However, it suﬀers from the restriction that no
cross-sectional correlation is allowed and that it can only test for stationarity
of all series in the sample. By contrast, the tests by Im et al. (2003), Maddala
and Wu (1999) as well as Choi (2001) (Fisher’s ADF and PP test) allow for
individual unit root processes. They specify individual unit root tests and
derive test statistics to test the null hypothesis H0 : αi = 0, for all i
against the alternative that at least one αi  = 0. While the tests may include
individual-speciﬁc short-run dynamics and deterministics such as time trends
for each panel member, cross-sectional correlation between countries is still
not fully accounted for. This may be a relevant issue for actual and perceived
inﬂation rates in a panel of closely related countries, such as the European
countries analyzed here. Therefore, we additionally test for panel unit roots
with the Pesaran (2007) Cross-Sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF)
test. The test computes a t-bar statistic averaging t-statistic values for
H0 : αi = 0 from a standard ADF-regression augmented with lagged and
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced values of the cross-sectional mean of the series. All panel
unit root tests are calculated with three lags.
The test results in Table B.1 uniformly reject the null of a unit root in in-
ﬂation in favor of the alternative of stationarity of at least some series in
the panel. However, the null cannot be rejected with the stricter alternative
of stationarity of all series in the Levin et al. (2002) test. Regarding the
stationarity of perceived inﬂation rates in the panel, test results are less con-
clusive. The Im et al. (2003) and the Maddala and Wu (1999) tests reject
the null of a unit root at the 5% level, favoring the alternative of station-
arity of some series in the panel. By contrast, the Choi (2001) and, more
strongly, the Pesaran (2007) CADF test cannot reject the null of a unit root.
Our results are in line with ﬁndings in Lein and Maag (2011), who also
ﬁnd that inﬂation perceptions are more persistent in a similar panel setting
for a shorter sample period. Generally, empirical evidence on the order of
integration of inﬂation series is mixed, Altissimo et al. (2006) conclude in
a survey that empirical ﬁndings seem to lean towards stationarity of inﬂation.
Due to the inconclusive evidence on stationarity of perceived and actual in-
ﬂation in our panel, we furthermore test for panel cointegration between
perceived and actual inﬂation. Results are presented for seven panel coin-
35tegration test statistics proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2001, 2004) that are
calculated by extending the Engle-Granger-framework to the panel setting
and testing for stationarity of the residual from a regression with I(1) vari-
ables, while allowing for individual ﬁxed eﬀects and time trends. The null
hypothesis of no cointegration (ρi = 1) is tested either against the alternative
of a common cointegrating vector (ρi = ρ < 1) or against the alternative of
individual cointegrating relationships (ρi < 1). The Kao (1999) panel cointe-
gration test is also residual-based, but does not allow for individual-speciﬁc
deterministics. Stationarity of the residuals from the ﬁrst-stage regression is
then tested with a panel ADF test on the null of no cointegration against the
alternative of a common cointegrating vector. Finally, the Maddala and Wu
(1999) test computes individual Johansen cointegration trace tests and max-
imum eigenvalue tests and uses those to obtain a combined Fisher statistic.
Gutierrez (2003) conducts a Monte Carlo experiment to compare the power
of Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2001, 2004) tests and ﬁnds that as T gets
large, the Pedroni tests have higher power than the Kao test.
Results shown in Table B.2 give strong evidence of a cointegration relation
between perceived and actual inﬂation over the whole sample period. All
Pedroni tests, as well as the Kao (1999) test, reject the null of no cointegra-
tion in favor of the alternative of either a common or individual cointegrat-
ing vectors at the 1% level. While the Maddala and Wu (1999) trace test
and maximum-eigenvalue test rejects both the null of no and the null of at
most one cointegration relation, test statistics for the latter are signiﬁcantly
smaller. Our, quite intuitive, result of cointegration between perceived and
actual inﬂation is in line with ﬁndings in Lein and Maag (2011) who also
report panel cointegration between perceptions and inﬂation with a slightly
diﬀerent sample.
Table B.1: Panel Unit Root Tests for Perceived and Actual Inﬂation
Perceptions Inﬂation
Method Stat. Prob.* Stat. Prob.*
Alternative: Stationarity of all series in the panel
Levin, Lin & Chu t -1.496 0.067 -0.098 0.461
Alternative: Stationarity of some series in the panel
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -2.184 0.015 -4.185 0.000
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 33.742 0.028 53.513 0.000
PP - Fisher Chi-square 27.530 0.121 66.159 0.000
Pesaran CADF t-bar -1.986 0.245 -2.594 0.002
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Sample period: 1996m1–2010m12.
36Table B.2: Panel Cointegration Tests between Perceived and Actual Inﬂation
Method 1996m1–2010m12
Pedroni Tests (Weighted) Stat. Prob.
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.
Panel v-Statistic 9.015 0.000
Panel rho-Statistic -6.627 0.000
Panel PP-Statistic -4.270 0.000
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.571 0.000
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.
Group rho-Statistic -4.957 0.000
Group PP-Statistic -4.058 0.000
Group ADF-Statistic -3.270 0.001
Kao ADF Test t-Stat. Prob.
-6.154 0.000
Maddala & Wu Test Fisher-Stat.* Prob.
Trace test
None 202.600 0.000
At most 1 89.980 0.000
Max.-Eigenvalue test
None 165.500 0.000
At most 1 89.980 0.000
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution.
Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
37C Rationality Tests under Symmetric Loss
We applied three types of rationality tests:
• A traditional Mincer-Zarnowitz regression where the perception error
is regressed on a constant and lagged perception errors.
• As a test for bias, we applied the non-parametric test of Dufour (1981)
and Campbell and Ghysels (1995) which has the advantage of avoiding
restrictive assumptions on well-behaved residuals as in the case of most
of the regression-based tests. Suppose that we compute the absolute
value of the diﬀerence between each observation and the mean, and
then rank these observations from high to low. Then the test is based
on the idea that the sum of the ranks for the samples above and below
the median should be similar. We can use a Wilcoxon signed rank test
with the null hypothesis that the median of the perception errors is
equal to zero. According to Campbell and Ghysels (1995), this test is
preferable to parametric tests for small samples.
• As a test for eﬃciency, we again use a test proposed by Dufour (1981)
and Campbell and Ghysels (1995) to test for absence of serial correla-
tion in the forecasts errors, i. e. that the median of the product of two
consecutive perception errors is centered on a median of zero.
We do not report the Mincer-Zarnowitz results here as the result is well-
known from other studies, see for instance Jonung and Laidler (1988), Lein
and Maag (2011) and Dräger (2011). Rationality under symmetric loss is
rejected in all cases, irrespective of controlling for possible structural breaks
at the end of 2001 or 2007. The results, however, are available from the
authors upon request.
This rejection is probably to a large extent driven by the “ineﬃciency chan-
nel”. The results of the two non-parametric tests shown in table (C.1) re-
vealed that in a number of cases we cannot reject unbiasedness once we
control for possible structural breaks by splitting the sample appropriately.
However, eﬃciency is rejected in all cases irrespective of sample splits.
38Table C.1: Nonparametric Rationality Tests: Unbiasedness and Eﬃciency
Unbiasedness
1996m1–2010m12 1996m1–2001m12 2002m1–2010m12 1996m1–2007m12
Country Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.
AT 6.840 *** 7.287 *** 1.884 * 8.040 ***
BE 0.921 6.114 *** 3.321 *** 1.892 *
ES 3.585 *** 6.602 *** 0.887 3.924 ***
FI 10.827 *** 7.371 *** 7.557 *** 9.542 ***
FR 3.522 *** 6.467 *** 1.053 4.231 ***
GER 3.219 *** 4.756 *** 0.379 4.492 ***
GR 6.153 *** 1.086 6.533 *** 5.362 ***
IT 2.098 ** 4.823 *** 1.203 1.987 **
NL 2.746 *** 7.354 *** 2.224 ** 1.638
PT 0.542 5.530 *** 3.664 *** 1.630
Eﬃciency
1996m1–2010m12 1996m1–2001m12 2002m1–2010m12 1996m1–2007m12
Country Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.
AT 10.608 *** 7.165 *** 7.554 *** 9.499 ***
BE 10.153 *** 6.185 *** 8.095 *** 8.993 ***
ES 10.690 *** 6.902 *** 8.089 *** 9.450 ***
FI 11.418 *** 7.320 *** 8.589 *** 10.222 ***
FR 9.944 *** 6.804 *** 7.277 *** 8.304 ***
GER 10.569 *** 6.627 *** 8.225 *** 9.557 ***
GR 11.307 *** 6.907 *** 8.887 *** 10.081 ***
IT 10.823 *** 6.844 *** 8.284 *** 9.573 ***
NL 11.240 *** 7.251 *** 8.524 *** 10.236 ***
PT 10.478 *** 6.294 *** 8.381 *** 9.353 ***
Test statistic: Wilcoxon signed rank.
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
39D Structural Break Tests
Table D.1: Quandt-Likelihood-Ratio Test for Structural Breaks
Country Lossaversion with thold1 Lossaversion with thold2
Max. Wald F p-value date Max. Wald F p-value date
AT 53.892 0.000 2008m09 53.008 0.000 2008m09
BE 30.449 0.000 2008m06 33.299 0.000 2008m06
ES 16.170* 0.055 2003m07 25.271* 0.002 2006m06
FI 23.190 0.008 2008m04 24.821 0.004 2007m12
FR 30.074 0.000 2002m02 37.286 0.000 2008m03
GER 42.598 0.000 2007m08 41.840 0.000 2007m09
GR 23.495 0.007 2008m07 18.962** 0.011 2002m09
IT 22.528 0.010 2008m07 23.272 0.007 2008m07
NL 25.205 0.003 2002m10 36.786 0.000 2002m10
PT 13.157 0.247 1998m06 9.152* 0.451 2001m06
Note: *, ** denotes 30%, 40% trimmed data, respectively. The default is 15% trimmed data.
Sample period: 1996m1–2010m12.
40